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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In France, the strong tendency, worked out mainly with re-
gard to divorce, is to consider reciprocal fault as double reason for
releasing the parties rather than no reason at all.7 Certainly the
majority of French writers favor this view." It must not be for-
gotten, however, that particularly in the case of cruel treatment
there is much to be said for the view that mutual recriminations
due to the heat of provocation may tend to cancel one another.9
Much must also be said for the French doctrine that where mutu-
ally intolerable offenses are not present, wide discretion should
be left to the judge10 to attempt a reconciliation.
This question of whether two wrongs can ever make a right
has not been materially discussed in the Louisiana decisions. The
court has insisted upon the preservation of the marital status, but
the constant change in our customs and conventions may bring
about further modification of the present doctrine and its effects.
In the event of releasing the spouses from an impossible marital
relationship, the question as to which spouse should be granted
the decree is of no importance except as to alimony1 1 and custody
of children, the matter of primary consideration being the disso-
lution of the marriage relationship for the benefit of all parties
concerned.
W. S.
WILLS-REVOCATION OF SECOND WILL REINSTATES THE FIRST
ONE--Upon the death of the testatrix, two purported wills in olo-
graphic form were offered for probate, one dated August 27, 1927
and the other April 5, 1928. The will bearing the posterior date con-
7. "Lorsque Ie demandeur est lui-mgme coupable envers son conjoint, la
seule consdquence de ce fait eat que lea causes du divorce existent en double,
et qu'il y a deux raisons au lieu d'une pour Ie prononcer." 1 Planiol, Trait6
El~mentalre de Droit Civil (12 ed. 1937) 422, no 1205.
(Translation) "When the plaintiff is himself guilty towards his spouse,
the only consequence of this fact is that the grounds for divorce are double,
and that there are two reasons instead of one for pronouncing it." See also
1 Marcad6, Explication Th~orlque et Pratique du Code Napoleon (5 ed. 1852)
607, no 769.
8. See 1 Colin et Capitant, Cours Elmentaire de Droit Civil Frangais
(8 ed. 1934) 216, no 189 (5).
9. Cass., 18 Janv. 1881, Dalloz. 1881.1.125; Cass., 12 janv. 1903, Sirey.1903.1.
279.
10. 7 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangals (5 ed. 1913) 301-302,
§ 477.
11. See Mouille v. Schutten, 190 La. 841, 865, 183 So. 191, 198-199 (1938)
(O'Niell, C.J., dissenting on the admission of testimony, not on the merits).
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tained a revocatory clause and was torn into three pieces. Counsel
admitted that the destruction of the second will had the effect of
revoking it and so the only question at issue was the legal exist-
ence of the first will. Held, that the first will was never revoked.
Succession of Dambly, La. Sup. Ct., Docket No. 34,952 (1938)
(Rehearing denied, Jan. 10, 1939).
There has been no previous case in Louisiana jurisprudence
establishing the time when the expressed revocation of the testa-
tor takes legal effect. The provisions of the Civil Code dealing
with revocation,' except for a few immaterial changes, are the
same as those of the Code Napoleon.2 The earlier French com-
mentators were of the opinion, and the jurisprudence was to the
effect, that revocation of a posterior testament which itself had
revoked an anterior testament only reinstated the earlier docu-
ment to the extent provided by the testator in a formal expression
of his intention.8 But more recently there has developed a strong
tendency to modify this doctrine to the effect that a revocation of
the revoking will is in itself a sufficient manifestation of intention
on the part of the testator to reinstate his former testament.4 The
underlying theoretical analysis is that the expression of the revo-
cation has the immediate effect of revoking the substance of the
earlier testament; but that nonetheless, the formal instrument
remains in existence until the death of the testator and the re-
vival of the substance may result from proof of the intention of
the testator to reinstate the earlier document as his last will and
testament.' The present Louisiana decision reaches the same re-
1. Arts. 1690-1696, 1710, 1559, 1589, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. Arts. 1035-1039, 1047, 953, French Civil Code.
3..."La rdvocation d'un second testament qui lui-mgme en avait rdvoqud
un premier, ne fait revivre le premier testament, qu'autant que Is teatateur
a manifestd cette intention dans P'acte de rdvocation." (The revocation of a
second will which itself had revoked a first one, only revives the first will in-
sofar as the testator manifests this intention in the act of revocation.) Cass.,
7 f~v. 1843, Sirey.1843.1.513, Dalloz.1843.1.155. See also 22 Demolombe, Cours de
Code Napoleon, Trait6 des Donations Entre-vifs et des Testaments, V (1876)
131-132, no 162; Troplong, Droit Civil Expliqu6, Des Donations Entre-vifs et
des Testaments, III (3 ed. 1872) 565, no 2065.
4. "Quand la rdvocation est rdtractde, Ze testament antdrieur revit comme
s'il n'avait jamais dtd rdvoqud." (When the revocation is withdrawn, the for-
mer will revives as if it had never been revoked.) 5 Planiol et Ripert, Traitd
Pratique de Droit Civil Frangals (1933) 759, no 710. See also Rennes, ler juill.
1878, Sirey.1879.2.117, Dalloz.1879.2.15; Req., 26 mars 1879, Sirey.1879.1.253,
Dalloz.1879.1.285; Paris, ler mars 1929, D.H. 1929, 258; Cass., 15 mai 1878, Sirey.
1879.1.160, Ref. Sirey.1.696, Dalloz.1879.1.32. 11 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit
Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1919) 514-515, § 725, adheres to the earlier strict view
(see note 3, supra).
5. "En effet, la rdvocation n'attaquant pas Ze corps et la substance du
testament rdvoqud, et n'en aZtdrant ni Za orne ni Za solennitd, il n'est pas
exact de dire qu'ele le mette entlerement au ndant. Le testament continue d
1939]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. I
sult as that advanced by the late commentators and court deci-
sions in France but is arrived at by a different legal analysis of
the problem.
A testament is by its very nature alterable until the death of
the testator, and this right of alteration is not susceptible to any
restrictions, voluntary or otherwise. To make an express revoca-
tion, the testator must do so by a formal declaration of intention
in an instrument written in the form and clothed with the for-
malities prescribed for testaments.7 A revocation is merely a pro-
vision incorporated into a will; or, when it stands alone, it is in
reality nothing other than a will itself and is just as inactive and
inoperative as a will until probated.8 If the revocation took effect
immediately upon being incorporated into the will, this would in
reality be giving a fixed status or legal existence to a part of the
will (the revocation) before the death of the testator, in violation
of the provisions of the Civil Code which stipulate that no will
can have legal effect unless it has been probated.9 Employing the
aforementioned premises, the Louisiana Supreme Court con-
cluded that the revocation in the second will had no effect, as the
will was never probated.
The language of the court in the principal case that "They
[counsel] not only concede, but argue, that in the case at bar the
revoking will was revoked,"10 would lead one to believe that if the
question of destruction had not been conceded, the court might
subsister matdrieslement, et d constanter 76galement Za voZontd que le testa-
teur avait d'abord manifestde." (In effect, since the revocation does not attack
the body or the substance of the revoked will, nor alter the form or solem-
nity, it is not exact to say that it [the revocation] makes it [the will] null
and void. The will continues to exist materially, and legally to establish the
wish that the testator had first manifested.) 11 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit
Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1919) 515-516, § 725, note 12. See also 14 Laurent, Prin-
cipes de Droit Civil (2 ed. 1876) 215, no 197; 22 Demolombe, Cours de Code Na-
poldon, Trait6 des Donations Entre-vifs et des Testaments, V (1876) 134, no
163; Troplong, Drott Civil Epliqu6, Des Donations Entre-vifs et des Testa-
ments,III (3 ed. 1872) 566, no 2065.
. 6. Art. 1690, La. Civil Code of 1870; Succession of Boudreau, 10 La. Ann.
709 (1855); Succession of Gilmore, 157 La. 130, 102 So. 94 (1924); Succession of
Nelson, 163 La. 458, 112 So. 298 (1927).
7. Arts. 1691-1692, La. Civil Code of 1870; Succession of Boudreau, 10 La.
Ann. 709 (1855); Hollingshead v. Sturgis, 21 La. Ann. 450 (1869); Succession
of Cunningham, 142 La. 701, 77 So. 506 (1918); Succession of Guiraud, 164 La.
620, 114 So. 489 (1927); Succession of Feitel, 187 La. 596, 175 So. 72 (1937).
Contra: Fuselier v. Masse, 4 La. 423 (1832): A subsequent change of disposi-
tion of property, in a will which is invalid, shows such a sufficient change of
mind as will revoke a former donation.
8. Saunders, Lectures on the Civil Code of Louisiana (1925) 339; Cross, A
Treatise on Successions (1891) 103.
9. Art. 1644, La. Civil Code of 1870; Succession of McDermott, 136 La. 80,
66 So. 546 (1914); Succession of Feitel, 187 La. 596, 175 So. 72 (1937).
10. Succession of Dambly, La. Sup. Ct., Docket No. 34,952 (1938).
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have concluded that the tearing of the will into three pieces was
not a sufficient destruction to prevent the probating of the testa-
ment.
While an express revocation must be clothed with certain
formalities," a tacit revocation may either be made in the form
of a valid posterior testament containing dispositions inconsistent
with the previous testament, 2 or "from some act which supposes
a change of will.' 1 3 Under Article 1589 the court has recognized
the existence of a third method of revocation, but this is appli-
cable only in those cases in which the erasures destroy some part
that is essential to the validity of the will."4 The court has re-
fused each time to recognize the intention of the testator unless it
is established by some mode of active expression as provided in
the Civil Code.15
Nowhere in the Code is it provided that the destruction of a
will revokes it. This is no doubt due to the simple reason that
after destruction of the testament there is no will in existence and
the testator has placed himself in the same situation as though
he had never executed a will." To accomplish recovation by de-
ll. Arts. 1691-1692, La. Civil Code of 1870, cited in note 7, supra.
12. Art. 1693, La. Civil Code of 1870; Succession of Bowles, 3 Rob. 31
(1842); Hollingshead v. Sturgis, 21 La. Ann. 450 (1869); Succession of Muh, 35
La. Ann. 394, 48 Am. Rep. 242 (1883); Succession of Hill, 47 La. Ann. 329, 16
So. 819 (1895); Succession of Race, 144 La. 157, 80 So. 234 (1918).
13. Art. 1691, La. Civil Code of 1870. In the Succession of Hill, 47 La. Ann.
329, 333, 16 So. 819, 821 (1895), it was said that "'from some other act which
supposes a change of will' is to be interpreted and explained by the follow-
ing Article of the Code (1695) .. " See also Hollingshead v. Sturgis, 21 La.
Ann. 450 (1869); Succession of Muh, 35 La. Ann. 394, 48 Am. Rep. 242 (1883);
Succession of Tallieu, 180 La. 257, 156 So. 345 (1934).
14. Art. 1589, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Erasures not approved by the testa-
tor are considered as not made, and words added by the hand of another as
not written.
"If the erasures are so made as to render it impossible to distinguish
the words covered by them, it shall be left to the discretion of the judge to
declare, if he considers them important, and in this case only to decree the
nullity of the testament."
In the Succession of Muh, 35 La. Ann. 394, 399, 48 Am. Rep. 242, 246
(1883), it was held that "Erasures of clauses in the body of the will affect only
the dispositions erased. Erasure of the signature strikes at the existence of
the instrument as a will."
15. The court cannot presume a change of intention for the testator,
when he had done no act which supposed a change of will: Succession of
Cunningham, 142 La. 701, 711, 77 So. 506, 510 (1918). A letter is not a revoca-
tion: Hollingshead v. Sturgis, 21 La. Ann. 450 (1869). The finding of a will
among worthless papers in a valise does not raise the presumption that the
intention of the testator was to revoke the testament: Succession of Blake-
more, 43 La. Ann. 845, 848, 9 So. 496 (1891).
16. Succession of Hill, 47 La. Ann. 329, 16 So. 819 (1895). See also, Succes-
sion of Tallieu, 180 La. 257, 270, 156 So. 345, 349 (1934).
"Bien que le Code soit must sur la question, on admet cependant la rdvo-
cation en se fondant sur 7'inexistence du testament." (Even though the Code
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struction, if the inference conveyed by silence on the part of the
Civil Code is to be given effect, the destruction must be so com-
plete as to render it impossible to offer the whole will in court for
probation. There must be some essential part or parts missing;
otherwise, the court would be legislating judicially by presuming
the revocation of a will in physical existence which had not been
revoked by any of the forms designated in the Civil Code.
H.P.S.
be silent on the question, the revocation is nevertheless conceded on the basis
of the inexistence of the will.) 5 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 4, at
765, no 714. See also 11 Aubry et 'Rau, op. cit. supra note 4, at 532, § 725.
